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On 25 April 2015, a Mw 7.8 earthquake struck central Nepal, killing more than 8700 people. An earth-
quake of this magnitude has long been anticipated in Nepal and the neighbouring northern Indian state
of Bihar, which straddle the active Himalayan frontal fault system. Drawing on ﬁeld research undertaken
before the earthquake, this paper traces the progress made in earthquake risk reduction efforts at the
national scale in Nepal and at the sub-national scale in Bihar. With their contrasting ‘governance land-
scapes’, we examine the political and institutional context and power relations among different stake-
holder groups, as well as the interests and political will motivating earthquake risk reduction. Nepal is a
post-conﬂict country, with a weak legislative and institutional setting for earthquake risk reduction, and
a multitude of different stakeholders (government, multi and bi-lateral donors, UN organisations, and
national and international NGOs) engaged in the disaster risk reduction process. Bihar, by comparison,
has a strong, hierarchical, sub-national government system with minimal inﬂuence of non-government
stakeholders in earthquake risk reduction. While Nepal appears to have progressed further in
strengthening earthquake resilience, the institutional structures in Bihar are stronger and could poten-
tially support more sustainable resilience building in the long-term. The role of individual ‘champions’ in
both instances (in Nepal among a national NGO, donors and multilateral agencies, and in Bihar within the
government) has been instrumental in shaping the earthquake risk reduction agenda and initiatives.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1 It will emerge in context as we develop our argument below that we mean by
‘political will’ a determination or resolve on the part of senior ofﬁcials and lea-1. Introduction
On 25 April 2015 a Mw 7.8 earthquake struck central Nepal
(now called the Gorkha Earthquake), with its epicentre located
80 km northwest of the capital city Kathmandu in Lamjung Dis-
trict. This was followed, less than three weeks later, by a Mw
7.3 earthquake northeast of the capital in Dolakha District. In
Nepal, more than 8700 people were killed and 20,000 injured in
this earthquake sequence, with more than 500,000 homes de-
stroyed [92]. In Bihar, on the Indian side of the border with Nepal,
60 people were killed and hundreds injured, with many districts in
the north of the state affected [11].
An earthquake of this magnitude has long been anticipated in
the Himalaya [5]. Loss estimation scenarios based on a repeat of the
1934 earthquake in modern day Kathmandu have suggested an
order of magnitude higher death toll than resulted from the 25
April 2015 event [23,53]. In 1934 a similar number of people had
died, with 20% of the building stock in the Kathmandu Valley de-
stroyed and 40% damaged [23]. Eighty-one years later ther Ltd. This is an open access article
k (S. Jones).Kathmandu Valley was home to far more people living at much
higher density. One might ask, why were the effects not as bad as
had been anticipated by the scenarios? In part, there was luck. The
earthquake had a smaller magnitude than the 1934 earthquake (M
7.8 versus 8.4), leading to lower intensities. The earthquake stuck at
noon on a Saturday. Schools were closed. Many people were out of
doors. But there have also been several years of intensive work on
preparedness and risk reduction which may have also been a factor.
This paper will not attempt to answer this question. Time and
in-depth forensic studies will hopefully shed light on the factors
that accounted for the damage and loss in Nepal in April 2015.
Instead, drawing on ﬁeld research undertaken before the earth-
quake, this paper explores the risk reduction efforts at the national
scale in Nepal and at the sub-national scale in Bihar, with a par-
ticular focus on the role of governance and political will1 in
earthquake risk reduction. In so doing, the paper responds to a callunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
dership in government and the opinion-forming elite in society to implement and
enforce a policy. The sources and constraints on political will are many and varied.
They include electoral pressure, the logic of party-political advantage, international
(e.g. donor) inﬂuence, legal or bureaucratic requirement and material beneﬁt [106].
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that create both incentives and disincentives for DRR [101].
While weak governance and lack of political will are frequently
cited as barriers to effective DRR [101,106], there remains a lack of
evidence on the effectiveness of different governance systems for
DRR [11,96]. This paper provides some of the evidence called for.
Empirical studies suggest that important governance issues un-
derlie the effectiveness of earthquake risk reduction practices,
revealing, for example, that earthquake mortalities are greater in
newer than older democracies [52] and that public sector cor-
ruption is positively correlated with earthquake deaths [27]. While
critical structuralist accounts of the underlying causes of disasters
exist (see, for example, [7], [36], [103] and [104]), little attention
has been given to the speciﬁc processes behind these ﬁndings. For
example, Williams notes that for the factors identiﬁed in econo-
metric studies correlated with the number of people who die in
disasters, there is a limited understanding of how the mechanisms
and causal processes operate in practice. This paper aims to con-
tribute to this understanding by adopting a more qualitative ap-
proach to unpack the mechanisms and processes underlying
earthquake risk reduction initiatives within the broad ‘governance
landscape’ of DRR.
The state or government is a prominent stakeholder within the
DRR governance landscape. For Wilkinson, the government has
ﬁve key roles:
 as providers of disaster risk reduction goods and services;
 as risk avoiders;
 as regulators of private sector activity;
 as promoters of collective action;
 as coordinators of multi-stakeholder activities.
In the context speciﬁcally of earthquake risk governance,
Wilkinson's principles take concrete forms.
 Risk reduction through provision of seismic information,
strengthening critical infrastructure including schools and
health facilities, risk awareness training and preparedness,
mapping of possible secondary hazards such as landslides;
 Risk avoidance through safe construction methods in new
public buildings and facilitation of safe private sector con-
struction (e.g. through training and ﬁnancing arrangements);
 Private sector regulation through appropriate building codes
and their enforcement;
 Promotion of collective action through decentralized program-
ming at sub-national and local scales including community
based disaster risk reduction;
 Coordination of multi-stakeholder activities including scientists,
planning departments, building and urban management, local
authorities, NGOs and humanitarian organizations.
This suite of actions constitutes a state-of-the-art menu for
national and sub-national governments backed up by a great deal
of engineering experience and research in natural and social sci-
ences [56]. All these actions are considered feasible, even in low-
income countries, although in some (as we will see in the case of
Nepal), donors pay for the much of this activity. There is con-
siderable evidence that these actions save lives, assets and losses
to government and donors from the destruction of investments
[108].
In our comparative treatment of risk governance in Nepal and
Bihar, we deﬁne ‘progress’ or ‘success’ as effective function in one
or more of these roles. This is clearly a minimalist deﬁnition of
‘success’. As noted above, ideally one would be able to parse the
risk-creating versus risk-reducing factors and show that ‘effective
functioning’ in such roles did, in fact, prevent deaths and reducedamage. It is too early, and, perhaps also a quixotic challenge to
understand a complex event in so much detail. Time will tell. For
now, however, we help to lay the foundation for better under-
standing by focusing on what we call the ‘governance landscape’.2. Understanding the ‘governance landscape’ for earthquake
risk reduction
The framework for this research draws upon political economy
analysis (PEA) which “is used by development agencies to enhance
their understanding of the economic, political and social processes
that drive or block policy reform” [17]. PEA examines the in-
centives, interests, institutions and power relations facing key
stakeholders and “focuses on how power and resources are dis-
tributed and contested in different contexts and the implications
for development outcomes” [20]. The Department for Interna-
tional Development [20] also suggest that PEA seeks to understand
what drives political behaviour and how this shapes particular
policies and programmes. It examines the interests and incentives
facing different groups; the role that formal and informal institu-
tions play; the role of external drivers; and the impact of values
and ideas on political behaviour and public policy. Drawing on the
key themes of PEA, we begin by setting out a framework for
analysing what we call the ‘governance landscape’ for DRR. The
framework considers both structure (systemic features of the
‘governance landscape’) and agency (the incentives and disin-
centives that shape the behaviour of actors) and the interactions
between the two [28].
We use the term ‘governance landscape’ in this paper to refer
to three speciﬁc aspects of DRR governance. First is what we call
the ‘stakeholder context’ of DRR. This refers to the stakeholders
involved in implementing DRR, the relationships among them, and
the role of power in these relationships [59]. As noted elsewhere
(e.g. [49]) DRR currently takes place within a broader neo-liberal
agenda where the functions of the nation state are being redis-
tributed ‘upwards’ to international institutions, ‘downwards’ to
regional and local tiers of authority and ‘outwards’ to a range of
non-state actors [12].
The sharing of power among stakeholders has undoubtedly
generated a more complex and challenging governance landscape
for executing any particular policy objective. Goodwin [34] argues
that the policy world is now made up of diverse, overlapping and
integrated networks often operating beyond effective control by
formal structures of government (e.g. in the case of disaster risk
reduction, the Hyogo Framework for Action – now the Sendai
Framework for Action-and their associated global and regional
platforms). Ojha et al. [65, p. 365] go as far as to suggest that the
factor that “hinders effective governance in most situations is the
prevalence of complex interplay of power and knowledge among
diverse groups of actors with unequal command over resources to
inﬂuence mutual interactions that underpin governance actions”.
This is also the view of the civil society and academic authors of
the South Asia Disaster Report 2012/13 [26], who speciﬁcally frame
disaster risk as driven by use and misuse of economic power at
global, regional and national scale, calling attention to the intimate
link between ‘development’ (e.g. overseas direct investment) and
disaster risk creation. A similar view is advanced in the [95] Global
Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction in which the
UNISDR speciﬁcally single out movements of international ﬁnance
capital as contributing to the creation of disaster risk. It is there-
fore useful to situate DRR in terms of this broader political context
to fully explore the inﬂuence of multiple stakeholder groups.
The second aspect of the ‘governance landscape’ we refer to as
the ‘institutional context’ or the speciﬁc ‘apparatus’ for enforce-
ment of regulations and standards and the delivery of DRR
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dicial context and divisions of responsibilities and roles for DRR).
Some scholars suggest that the political location of the responsible
agency at national, apex scale, such as a so-called National Disaster
Management Authority, is of particular relevance to DRR. Proxi-
mity to national political power is thought to inﬂuence the extent
of authority for mainstreaming DRR [55]. Policy and institutional
coherence is important but can be difﬁcult to achieve due to the
superimposition of successive waves of public sector reform, often
under donor inﬂuence, giving rise to persistently ill-deﬁned
mandates or overlapping jurisdictions [8]. In DRR, ‘mainstreaming’
throughout different sectors implies an intention to smooth out
such inconsistencies, but in so doing a high level of complexity in
governance arrangements, roles and responsibilities may emerge.
The third aspect of the ‘governance landscape’ explored here
can be termed ‘incentive context’. We refer here to incentives and
disincentives that affect the decisions of government staff at all
levels. These may be inﬂuenced by career aspirations, adminis-
trative rules, professional and personal ethical principles, legal
responsibility and peer pressure [106]. For Williams [101], key
factors for consideration include: disincentives towards public
goods provision, with a preference towards providing private
goods for political patronage and engaging in ‘visible’ activities for
winning political support; rent seeking and corruption (e.g. col-
lusion between corrupt building contractors and building in-
spectors); political costs of controlling settlement (e.g. imposing
building restrictions on sought-after land); powerful interest
groups (e.g. with lobbying power); vested interests blocking or-
ganisational reform (e.g. decentralisation, mainstreaming); and
political costs (e.g. post-disaster leadership changes).
Williams [101, p. 7] also emphasises the importance of political
will and suggests that it is the primary reason that many pro-
grammes fail to deliver in their expected beneﬁts which “is re-
ﬂected in the low priority and poor level of resources for DRR …
not enough attention has yet been given to the question of how
political will arises and how to strengthen it”. Individuals with
high levels of political will can be seen as champions and in cli-
mate change research some attention has been given to the role of
‘champions’ in raising awareness as a vehicle for behavioural
change [81]. Although Williams [101] has noted the importance of
champions, little attention has been given to the role of champions
in DRR research. In both the Nepal and Bihar situation, champions
in earthquake risk reduction have had a powerful inﬂuence. They
have been the ones who have, at least for a time, motivated others
and generated political will. Wisner et al. [106] caution that lea-
dership is insufﬁcient unless it is sustained by effective social
demand and leaders watch over implementation, as there seems
to be a degrading in political will for disaster risk management
lower down the government hierarchy.
In fact all three aspects of the ‘governance landscape’ high-
lighted above are highly entwined and mutually inﬂuential. In
Indonesia for example, Djalante et al. [24] suggest that a key im-
pediment to implementing the HFA is a lack of commitment from
government to mainstream DRR into broader development agen-
das. There, the resilience building agenda has been driven by the
participation of non-government stakeholders. This suggests that
there is a fundamental lack of political will within government but
that the broader stakeholder context and relations of power have
enabled some resilience building still to take place.
Our threefold analysis of risk governance landscape is rooted in
a body of theory that has shaped development studies and disaster
studies over the past decades. At the centre is a focus on power in
its many forms – political, economic and cultural – and the way
that stakeholders with various amounts of power interact with
each other and, in turn, how these interactions inﬂuence vulner-
ability and capability in relation to managing risk [105]. Wealready mentioned political economy. In a speciﬁcally environ-
mental application, this body of theory that goes back into the
18th century [67, p. 33–44]), is called political ecology [68,69].
Such understanding of power among stakeholders-in-relation-to-
the-world (‘world’ as environment as it is socially produced as
‘resource’ or ‘hazard’ – Wisner et al. [102]: 4–10) is complemented
by a survey of institutions (both formal and informal). This last
mentioned is the domain of political science [45], social psychol-
ogy (Slovic, [79]) and sociology, which is especially highly devel-
oped in the study of disasters [90]. Finally, a study of the moti-
vations for disaster management action brings us back to the
reality of material incentives, hence to political economy. The
whole of our discussion assumes the interplay of structure and
agency – that is, macro scale drivers such as the distribution of
power, wealth and income, that guide, but do not determine
choices and behaviour that retain a degree of freedom [9,33].
Following a brief account of the methodology adopted for this
study and an introduction to the background of the study areas,
the discussion for this paper is divided into three sections. The ﬁrst
focuses on the ‘stakeholder context’ and relationships between the
state and non-governmental actors such as NGOs and donors. The
second considers the ‘institutional context’, including the legisla-
tive, regulatory and policy context of DRR, the position of in-
stitutions responsible for DRR and the relative coherence of the
policy and institutional settings. The third section considers the
‘incentive context’ highlighted in the political economy literature
such as the role of champions, the availability of resources, visi-
bility and patronage. Each section features a comparison between
Nepal and Bihar.3. Case study areas and methodology
Located on the boundary of two converging tectonic plates,
Nepal and neighbouring India are highly susceptible to earth-
quakes [5]. Since 1500 AD, a total of eight earthquakes larger than
Mw 7.5 had been recorded across the Himalaya [4] not including
the Nepal earthquake of April 2015. Key events include the 1934
Bihar–Nepal earthquake which destroyed Kathmandu, and Mun-
ger and Muzaffarpur in Bihar State, killing more than 11,000
people across Nepal and Bihar; and the 2011 Sikkim earthquake
which killed more than 100 people and caused extensive damage
to buildings and infrastructure in Northeast India and Eastern
Nepal.
We focus our research on Nepal and the neighbouring Indian
State of Bihar (Fig. 1), which have evolved very different systems of
governance and state apparatus for reducing earthquake risk.
While a small country and a state within a large country may seem
an odd choice for comparison, there are solid grounds for the
coupling. Nepal actually has a smaller population than Bihar, and
is only 1.5 times the surface area. As of 1 January 2015, the po-
pulation of Nepal was estimated to be 28,811,808 people (in 2011
it was 27,156,367). The total area of Nepal is 147,180 km2 [97]. The
total population of Bihar as per the 2011 census is 104,099,452 and
the area is 94,163 km2 [13]. Nepal and India are ranked 145 and
135 respectively out of 187 counties in the Human Development
Index [94]. Nepal is classiﬁed as a low human development nation
and India a medium development nation. However, it is important
to recognise the interstate disparities in India. Based on the multi-
dimensional poverty index, more than half of the population of
Bihar lives below the Government of India’s extremely low na-
tional poverty line [25], in comparison to 25.2% living below the
national poverty line in Nepal [94].
In a number of respects, Nepal and Bihar share similar socio-
economic characteristics. They are both predominantly rural, with
83% of Nepal’s population residing in rural areas [14] and 89% in
Fig. 1. Map locating Nepal and the Indian State of Bihar. The black lines outline the country boundaries; the grey lines the state boundaries in India. The map traces the main
central thrust fault (source: [84]) which marks the boundary between the Indian and Eurasian tectonic plates and is considered to be the most active thrust fault in the study
area. The epicentres of earthquakes greater than Mw 6.0 (1911-June 2015) are indicated by the circles (source: [98]. These events are scaled by Mw, with the three most
recent earthquake epicentres identiﬁed (1¼Mw 7.8, 25 April Gorkha earthquake; 2¼Mw 7.3, 12 May Dolakha earthquake; and 3¼Mw 6.9 Sikkim earthquake).
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and Bihar at 55.7% and 74.07% respectively; followed by agri-
culture at 30.7% and 21.30% respectively; then industry, con-
tributing a mere 13.6% in Nepal and just 4.63% in Bihar based on
2014 estimate [16,93]. Economic growth in Bihar averaged at 5.1%
between 1999–2008 according to the Indian Government Central
Statistics Organisation but by 2010-11 had risen to over 14% [41].
Nepal’s economic growth rate by comparison is 5.5% [16] based on
2014 estimate.
There is a notable undersupply of public goods in both Bihar
and Nepal including electricity, water and healthcare with devel-
opment activities concentrating largely on urban centres [73,107].
In addition, social inequality based largely on caste and ethnicity is
high in both locations [10,30,54]. In common with the rest of
South Asia, Nepal and Bihar have had uneven experience with
democratisation and decentralisation [32]. While this and other
contributory factors led to a civil conﬂict in Nepal (1996-2006)
[73], in Bihar there has been a more low-level Naxalite insurgency
[18,88]. For decades, however, Bihar was considered a lawless state
known for its caste violence and corruption [60]. Thus while we
acknowledge that Bihar is not representative of India and inherent
differences are to be expected by comparing a federal state with a
nation, the application of the framework to these different scales
of governance demonstrates the versatility of the framework. It
can be applied at any level of governance.
The empirical data collection was undertaken by the ﬁrst two
authors of this paper. In Nepal, we began with a focus group dis-
cussion involving 12 people in January 2013 with the aim of
identifying the stakeholders engaged in earthquake risk reduction
in Nepal and exploring the relationships among them. The focus
group participants, identiﬁed through discussion with key in-
formants, represented a range of groups and views. The group
included Nepali scientists working for government institutions,
senior staff from international and national NGOs all of whom
were Nepali nationals, and international representatives from
donor organisations and donor-funded projects. We adapted the
Stakeholder Analysis approach developed by the ODI [80] toidentify the parties engaged in earthquake risk reduction in Nepal.
Participants were asked to write the stakeholders on sticky notes
and to arrange the stakeholders based on their level of power (i.e.
the inﬂuence they have over the earthquake reduction agenda in
Nepal), with the most powerful stakeholders positioned in the top
tier of the pyramid, and the least powerful in the bottom tier. The
activity was facilitated by the ﬁrst author who explored with the
participants why a particular stakeholder had been placed in a
particular position, the nature of their power and their motives.
The discussions and interactions between participants were re-
corded by the second author. A second exercise explored the
connections and relationships between stakeholders. For this, the
names of the stakeholders were written on different sized circles
reﬂecting their level of power. Participants were then asked to
arrange the circles to demonstrate the relationship between sta-
keholders. In order to unpack the focus group ﬁndings further, 26
in-depth, semi-structured interviews were undertaken in March
2013 with the stakeholders identiﬁed during the focus group,
along with further discussions with key informants. The inter-
views also explored the institutional and legislative context for
DRR, the role of different stakeholders and the factors that enable
or obstruct earthquake risk reduction in Nepal. The stakeholders
interviewed included representatives from international organi-
sations, multi- and bi-lateral donor organisations, government
bodies, and national and international NGOs.
In Bihar, an initial focus group discussion involving the activ-
ities outlined above was held in January 2013 with four people
who were based within the Bihar State Disaster Management
Authority, two of whom were seconded to the BSDMA from UN
organisations as part of a DRR capacity building initiative. Acutely
aware of participants’ subjectivity-particularly given that all par-
ticipants were linked to the BSDMA-a focus group discussion was
also held with 15 representatives from local and international
NGOs with the aim of exploring further the role of government
and non-government stakeholders in DRR in Bihar. The ﬁndings
corroborated those of the government group. In addition to the
focus group discussions, 19 in-depth, semi-structured interviews
Fig. 2. Power and inﬂuence pyramids created for Nepal (2a) and Bihar (2b). The more powerful/ inﬂuential the stakeholder was perceived to be in relation to earthquake risk
reduction, the closer they were positioned to the apex of the pyramid. The question was asked “Who or what organisations are most powerful and inﬂuential in earthquake
risk reduction?” (The question itself generated some debate among participants as they acknowledged a distinction between implementation (‘doing’ earthquake risk
reduction), policy and funding (‘enabling’ earthquake risk reduction). It was decided that the latter were more important and as such stakeholders enabling earthquake risk
reduction appeared higher in the pyramid).
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of stakeholder groups as Nepal and following the same metho-
dological approach.
The interviews were recorded and transcribed, with detailed
notes taken during the focus group discussions by the ﬁrst and
second authors. The transcripts and notes were analysed thema-
tically and coded based on the key themes of interest summarised
above. In a small number of cases, direct quotes from transcripts
have been very lightly edited without altering their meaning in
order to make it easier for the reader to grasp quickly the points
being made by non-native English speakers. A review of the policy
literature and numerous informal conversations also informed the
research in both locations.2 The ﬁve ﬂagship areas of the Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium are: Flagship 1
– School and Hospital Safety; Flagship 2 – Emergency Preparedness and Response;
Flagship 3 – Flood Risk Management; Flagship 4 – Community Based Disaster Risk
Management; and Flagship 5 – Policy/Institutional Strengthening (see: http://
www.un.org.np/coordinationmechanism/nrrc).4. Understanding the governance landscape for earthquake
risk reduction
4.1. The stakeholder context of DRR in Nepal and Bihar
This section explores the role and power of the state vis-à-vis
non-state actors. The stakeholder mapping process undertaken
with a range of representatives from different stakeholder groups
in both countries revealed who was perceived by focus group
members to be driving the agenda for earthquake risk reduction
and who had power to steer the process (Fig. 2a and b). In Nepal
the exercise generated considerable discussion and disagreement
among participants about which stakeholders had most power
and inﬂuence and should therefore appear at the top of the pyr-
amid. It took about half an hour and circular and convoluted dis-
cussions to ﬁnally reach an agreement. In Bihar, this process was
undertaken very rapidly with consensus among the group. The
resultant ‘power/ inﬂuence’ pyramids were, however, similar.
Government bodies were in the top tier. In Nepal, the Council of
Ministers was positioned at the top followed by the Ministry of
Home Affairs (MoHA) in which the Disaster Management Section
is located, followed by the Department of Urban Development and
Building Construction (DUDBC), the department responsible for
building code implementation. In Bihar, the Chief Minister and his
Cabinet were positioned at the top followed by key government
departments including the Bihar State Disaster Management De-
partment (BSDMD) and Bihar State Disaster Management Au-
thority (BSDMA).
In both pyramids, the second tier was occupied by UN organi-
sations and other central level government departments. In Nepal
this included the Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (NRRC), which
includes the Government of Nepal, multi- and bi-lateral donors,
and humanitarian and development partners working collectively
for DRR; and a prominent national NGO working for earthquake
safety (the National Society for Earthquake Technology, NSET-Ne-
pal). In Nepal, the Kathmandu Valley municipalities were inserted
below reﬂecting the power of the municipal governments in the
Kathmandu Valley which is seen to dominate the country. A third
tier included INGOs in Bihar and Nepal and, in Nepal only, multi-
and bi-lateral donors and development banks. A slightly different
picture emerged however, through the in-depth interviews. The
discussion below elaborates on these ﬁndings.
It is clear that the inﬂuence of international organizations in
Nepal is very signiﬁcant and that the donor community plays a
large role in advancing the DRR agenda, especially earthquake risk
reduction. As the director of a national NGO explained: “Nowadays
what I see is that, at least the major donors have included disaster
risk management agenda into their development strategy and since
Nepal’s economy depends on their development agenda, so they could
be said to be drivers – not our government – our government has
nothing to do with this”. The extent to which the agenda forearthquake risk reduction in particular is externally driven is re-
ﬂected in a comment made by a representative from a bi-lateral
donor: “We need to engage the government more, and to be fair to
them they have engaged, there are times when they’re looking at us
thinking ‘why are these foreigners so obsessed with earthquakes’-
really? But … from their part they do recognise that we don’t have
ulterior motives here-we’re not trying to take over”.
The UNDP has had a long presence in Nepal and has been
providing support to reduce the impact of disasters since the early
1990s. It has been instrumental in establishing the NRRC. Struc-
tured around ﬁve priority areas or ﬂagships2, the NRRC represents
“an unprecedented international alignment of donors – all working to
a common plan with a shared sense of urgency and ambition” [70].
Coordination among international organisations working in the
same country is a well-known challenge [2] and as one in-
dependent consultant in Nepal explained: “different organisations
are responsible for different things and there’s never any coordination
between them. There’s always a very disjointed approach and there’s
a reluctance to ever come together”. The NRRC has provided a me-
chanism through which to address these coordination challenges
and progress has certainly been made [83].
According to Panday [66] more than 60% of Nepal’s develop-
ment budget comes from bilateral and multilateral donors (40%
being state generated), of which 70% goes through the Finance
Ministry (i.e. to government). The rest goes through the Social
Welfare Council to NGOs and civil society groups. NGOs in Nepal
are particularly important for the implementation of DRR projects
reﬂecting the limited capacity of government at the local level. As
a representative from a bilateral donor organisation explained,
“We were trying to be absolutely transparent and say to the gov-
ernment, look, [as] there is no government system to fund through,
we’re going to fund a whole bunch of NGOs and the UN and the….Red
Cross….to help bring capacity to this county to help you to save more
lives”. This view was shared by a representative of an international
NGO: “NGOs are there because the government is not doing so. If the
government’s perfect there is no need of NGOs”.
There is a particularly strong national NGO for earthquake risk
reduction in Nepal called the National Society for Earthquake
Technology (NSET-Nepal) which, founded in 1993, is a well-es-
tablished and highly respected organisation. NSET-Nepal is en-
gaged in earthquake risk reduction activities including the retro-
ﬁtting of hospitals and schools, the training of masons in earth-
quake safe construction, earthquake sensitization and awareness
raising and community based hazard mapping and vulnerability/
capacity assessment. NSET executes projects funded by, for ex-
ample, USAID, UNICEF, the American Red Cross Society and the
Nepal Red Cross Society, and it is afﬁliated with a number of re-
gional and international networks. Viewed as a knowledge inter-
mediary, NSET-Nepal is the go-to organisation for information
about earthquake hazard and seismic safety. As a representative
from an international NGO explained: “Most of the people rely on
the brochures, maps, the data and information produced by NSET….
the ﬂag of USAID and NSET that we see on everything”. This reﬂects
NSET-Nepal’s relatively high position in the ‘power/inﬂuence’
pyramid (Fig. 2a).
Much of the donor money for DRR is channelled to interna-
tional NGOs for distribution to local NGOs for local level project
implementation. Local NGOs vary considerably in quality and do
not always have a good reputation. One international consultant
remarked that while international NGOs tend to appoint good
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people who have money and are well connected but may lack
capacities to manage. The interviewee went on to explain that
“there are zillions of NGOs in this country – its kind of an en-
trepreneurial thing”. NGOs are especially vulnerable to corruption
as they are accountable to no one (except possibly their donors)
and they do not come under the purview of anti-corruption
agencies like the Commission for the Integration of the Abuse of
Authority (CIAA) [58] although efforts to change this are being set
in motion.
By contrast, in Bihar State, government leadership in earth-
quake risk reduction is much stronger, and donors and multilateral
agencies currently play a less important role in shaping the
agenda.3 As India is wealthier than Nepal and now deﬁned by the
World Bank as a middle income country, the involvement of NGOs
may be expected to be less.4 This may have been compounded in
Bihar though by the fact that it has a history of ethnic-based
conﬂict, lawlessness and corruption (which was cited by an in-
ternational NGO representative as a reason for the historically low
prevalence of international NGOs and donors in Bihar as they
prefer to work in “poor but well governed states”). Disaster man-
agement was not a particular concern for the then Chief Minister,
Lalu Prasad Yadav (1990–1997), who is reported to have said after
the 2004 ﬂoods (one of the worst ﬂoods to have occurred in Bihar
that decade) that relief was not needed as ﬂood affected people
could “eat ﬁsh from the ﬂoodwaters” (NGO representative). The
current Chief Minister, Nitish Kumar, has been much more sym-
pathetic to DRR and welcomed initiatives of multilateral agencies.
He has a strong reputation for addressing the development chal-
lenges of the state, strengthening state institutions and improving
governance [15].
The UNDP has a mandate for advocacy and policy support to
the government and has previously played a valuable role in
promoting DRR in Bihar. A UN representative in Bihar explained:
“deﬁnitely international organisations have been able to set the
agenda for DRR,” highlighting numerous UNDP/Bihar government
initiatives: promoting the establishment of Emergency Operating
Centres at the state and district levels,5 developing Standard Op-
erating Procedures for DRR6 and aiding the Bihar State govern-
ment with expertise such as funding consultant positions within
the BSDMA to strengthen capacity. However, the UNDP no longer
has a presence in Bihar. As noted by a former UNDP employee
“now the institution [BSDMA] has been set up and government is
doing a lot of work – government is taking care of it now – so why
UNDP is needed?” UNICEF, however, continues to be engaged in
community-based DRR in Bihar State.
NGOs in Bihar are implementers of DRR initiatives on the
ground, ﬁlling a gap where government capacity is weak. They
also monitor government. In terms of recovery and relief, a re-
presentative from a government department, commenting on the
recent ﬂood disasters affecting the state, explained that “INGOs
and NGOs did wonderful things in 2004 and 2008 because the state
was not actually prepared … but when the state government now is
trying to take initiative, their role is an auxiliary role. They are3 This is partly because certain organisations may engage to a greater extent at
the national level, although their progammes do ﬁlter down to the state level
(particularly donor programmes) in poorer states.
4 For example, following a review of its donor multilateral and bilateral aid
programmes, in November 2012 it was announced that Britain would end its aid to
India in 2015 [91].
5 These are being promoted by the UN in all 38 Districts, and two are proposed
for Patna, but presently there is only one EOC in Patna.
6 SOPs “ﬁx the activities and responsibilities for conducting that activity”,
specifying who will do what so that activities are “more or less mandatory” (gov-
ernment representative). One SOP has been developed for ﬂooding and one is being
developed for earthquakes with the support of an external consultant.supporting the….state government.” But in terms of the im-
plementation and delivery of local level DRR initiatives and
awareness-raising, another government ofﬁcial asked “Who will do
it [implement DRR projects]? Because the ofﬁcials cannot always go
to the ﬁeld so the gap has to be ﬁlled with the help of the NGOs, CBOs
[community based organisations] or those people who are really
working in those ﬁelds”. As a representative from the BSDMA ex-
plained, “They [NGOs] are the initiators in some way when the
government does not play the role seriously”. NGOs were variously
described as ‘moderators’, ‘advocates’ and ‘checks on government’.
However, as reported for Nepal, smaller local NGOs vary in their
expertise and capacity with some operating like family businesses
(NGOs are also sometimes passed through dowries as though a
family asset). International level NGOs, by comparison, generally
have a better reputation.
4.2. The institutional context of DRR in Nepal and Bihar
In Nepal, the current legislation for disaster management is still
very relief-focused and dates back to 1982 (The Natural Disaster
Relief/Calamities Act). Although a new Act was drafted in 2006
(with support from Oxfam), its ratiﬁcation was not a priority for
the present or former Constituent Assembly [50]. As noted above,
the primary responsibility for disaster management in govern-
ment falls to the Disaster Management Section within the MoHA.
As MoHA commands the police and the armed police, and has
some inﬂuence over the deployment of the army7, it is appropriate
to locate a section responsible for relief and rescue within the
MoHA, but in a post-Hyogo context with an emphasis on disaster
risk reduction (prevention and mitigation), a position within a
development ministry (i.e. the Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local
Development) may have enabled more progress to be made in
DRR planning and implementation throughout the country. Fur-
thermore, the Disaster Management Section in MoHA has a small
number of staff reﬂecting its low priority within government.8 As
one UN representative noted, the greatest governance challenge is
the difﬁculty in capacity building within the MoHA as civil ser-
vants are generalists so it takes time to build up their expertise
and then they move on within a couple of years.
In the absence of a revised Disaster Management Act with a
focus on preparedness and risk reduction, most stakeholders
within Nepal are working to the National Strategy for Disaster Risk
Management (here after ‘the National Strategy’), which was the
outcome of a multi-stakeholder process, modiﬁed and approved
by the government in 2009. Described by a multilateral agency
representative as “the holy book that we are all working towards”,
the National Strategy proposed the creation of a separate National
Disaster Management Authority, under the Prime Minister’s Ofﬁce,
which would have the authority to mainstream DRR across all
ministries and to allocate funds. There has been some resistance to
this notion within the Ministry of Home Affairs, as potentially they
would lose some power to a new authority (and associated re-
sources channelled via donors). Instead, they are proposing a new
(larger) division within MoHA with its own Joint Secretary.97 The Nepal Police and Armed Police Force are Departments within MoHA;
while the Ministry of Defence organises and controls the army. The Home Minister
sits on the National Defence Council (with the Prime Minister, Defence Minister
and three others government representatives). Upon the Council’s recommenda-
tion, the President mobilises the army.
8 The number at the time of interviewing was reported to be 15 members of
staff (some of whom may have responsibilities in other sections as well).
9 At present the Disaster Management Section is headed by an undersecretary
who reports to a joint secretary. There are four joint secretaries in the Ministry of
Home Affairs, each of who may have 450 undersecretaries reporting to them. The
new division with its own joint secretary would elevate the status of disaster
management within the ministry. One representative from the Home Ministry
10 Of the 14 districts that had been involved in a UNDP programme creating
district disaster preparedness plans only half had accommodated project staff into
local government upon the withdrawal of external funding. These positions held by
experts can be critical as district staff so frequently transfer ofﬁce.
11 The reason for this was explained in an informal conversation with gov-
ernment staff. The government have very rigorous transparency processes in place
to prevent nepotism and patronage from playing out when appointments are
made, but this does not prevent favours being called in. If an accusation of
wrongdoing is made, the person making the appointment can be imprisoned and
cases take an exceptionally long time to resolve. It is a large risk to those re-
sponsible for making appointments.
12 The Patna Municipal Corporation, responsible for building code im-
plementation, is 96% understaffed (according to provision stipulated proportional
to population size in relevant legislation) and 180 technical posts have been
sanctioned but only 10% have been ﬁlled. It was noted by a representative of a
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authority over other ministries to enable DRR mainstreaming.
At the District level, government ofﬁcials were keen to point
out that ‘as the Act has not yet been passed’ they still have ‘Relief
Committees’ rather than ‘District Disaster Management Autho-
rities’ as the National Strategy advocates. This suggests some re-
sistance to preparedness-focused activity or perhaps recognition
that without the Act there are not the resources to support DRR at
the district level. Indeed, according to Nepal’s progress report on
the implementation of the HFA (2009-11), 67 out of 75 districts
prepared disaster preparedness plans in 2009, with support from
international agencies [63]. However, without the necessary bud-
getary allocation, it has been difﬁcult to turn these plans into
action.
In India, at the Central level, the Disaster Management Act was
passed in 2005 and a national body was created (National Disaster
Management Authority). The Prime Minister heads the NDMA
signifying the importance being given in the constitution to the
issue of disasters [19]. With its federal system of governance,
speciﬁc roles exist for state and central government. The NDMA
has responsibility for laying down the plans, policies and guide-
lines for disaster management and the states are meant to devise
policies and plans in accordance with the guidelines laid down by
the NDMA [19]. At the state level, ﬂexibility exists in terms of in-
stitutional arrangements. More disaster prone states have created
their own Disaster Management Departments while others have
smaller Disaster Management Authorities that sit within a De-
partment of Revenue.
In Bihar, a separate Disaster Management Department
(BSDMD) has existed since 2004 (as Bihar has regular ﬂoods) and
was formed out of a similar institution that had existed since 1978
as part of the Department of Revenue. In addition, falling under
the BSDMD is the Bihar State Disaster Management Authority
(BSDMA), which was created in 2007. While the Department car-
ries more responsibility for response, relief and mitigation, the
Authority takes more responsibility for risk reduction. This has
translated to an emphasis on ﬂoods within the BSDMD and an
emphasis on earthquakes in the BSDMA. In addition, the Authority
is responsible for producing DRR ‘guidelines’ which the Depart-
ment translates into ‘Standard Operating Procedures’ (essentially
the Authority provides the expertise while the Department is the
regulatory body).
Although the Authority sits under the Department, it is in a
strong position because it is ofﬁcially headed by the Chief Minister
(as speciﬁed in the 2005 Disaster Management Act) who can in-
struct other departments (Health, Education etc.) to bring into
effect DRR mainstreaming. Furthermore, there is a regulation that
all department ministers should attend BSDMA meetings. One
member of the Authority informed us that “Bihar is the only state
where our honourable Chief Minister….has categorically said that
every minister will attend, so that every decision that is taken in the
meeting is not something that is unknown to them. So this is quite a
new phenomenon….He has also deﬁned that any idea conceived and
formulated by BSDMA, if approved, will have to be implemented by
every respective department”. A member of the BSDMA interpreted
this as sending out the message that “the highest of importance
needs to be accorded….to this subject [DRR]”.
The BSDMA is considered to be one of the more progressive
state disaster management authorities in India. As one member
explained, “it was a matter of pride for us when we had meetings
with other states”. The BSDMA takes proposals gleaned from the(footnote continued)
explained that ultimately the aim would be to create a separate NDMA under the
Prime Minister and the Ministry of Home Affairs would be responsible only for
relief and response.National Act to Bihar's Cabinet for consideration. The BSDMA also
developed the state level Disaster Management Plan to guide DRR
activities. The Authority has secured its own ‘mitigation budget’
from central state funding enabling some independence from
political inﬂuence. This funding also enables the BSDMA to work
with and fund NGOs to implement projects such as awareness
raising initiatives.
However, according to a representative from a multi-lateral
agency, a key governance challenge for DRR in Bihar State is sus-
taining the impetus for DRR once external agencies have with-
drawn. For example, while international organisations can ‘push’
agendas forward, and place consultants in strategic positions
within government, unless the state government is willing to
continue to fund these positions after projects and programmes
have ended, the beneﬁts are short-lived.10 UN-funded posts can be
arranged more rapidly than government-funded positions and do
not depend on political inﬂuence, so departments tend to rely on
these professionals. As a UN representative explained, “actually
what happens is that Government of India systems involve very slow,
systematic long term processes, so what happens is that they [gov-
ernment departments] try to avoid those processes. They take too
long” 11. A related problem is the extreme understafﬁng of gov-
ernment departments. For example, within the Disaster Manage-
ment Authority there should be nine sectoral experts but none had
been appointed. There has been approval for a total of 49 staff but
the number currently serving in the department is much smaller.12
As in Nepal, it is a challenge to drive policy guidelines down
undiluted to the lower levels of the political chain. A number of
people, for example, commented on the (district) disaster man-
agement plans.13 One UN representative noted that these plans do
not include any measures for earthquake risk reduction, even in
the most earthquake prone districts within the state: “you will not
ﬁnd….a single ofﬁcer in the district who has any knowledge of
earthquake risk reduction”. The disaster management plans are a
kind of document that gets ‘compiled’ as a ‘ritual’ but “it does not
have an actionable plan component which will make it useable for the
purpose of enforcing accountability-so if something doesn’t happen,
you’ll not be able to put your ﬁnger on a particular person or agency
as being responsible for it” (NGO representative). Another inter-
viewee noted that the district disaster management plan “is a very
crucial document but what we ﬁnd is that it has become a shelf
document. The document is just prepared religiously because gov-
ernment says that you need to have it, so they are simply preparing it
and putting it on the shelf. There is no use of them.”
Building code implementation and land use planning are key to
effective earthquake risk reduction. In Nepal, this responsibility
falls to the Department of Urban Development and Buildingmunicipal corporation that there are not enough engineers to check the plans or to
make site visits. Over 6000 high rise buildings have been passed and only about
30% have been properly signed off (PMC employee).
13 In 2006 the NDMA issued guidelines for DDMPs and UNDP supported their
development in the 14 districts in which they worked. Other NGOs are currently
supporting the remaining districts in the production of DDMPs.
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ment) for private buildings over seven storeys and all government
buildings (except schools which are the responsibility of the
Ministry of Education and the private sector; some hospitals which
are the responsibility of the Ministry of Health and the private
sector; and local government buildings which fall under the
Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development, MoFALD). This
is an awkward situation because effective building code im-
plementation would require this department to preside over the
municipalities, but municipalities currently fall within the remit of
MoFALD. This is one area where institutional incoherence is evi-
dent. With many newmunicipalities being declared in Nepal,14 the
issue of urban planning and building code implementation is a
pressing concern.
In Bihar, in theory, the Urban Development Department has the
authority to ensure that building codes are adhered to. But while
the department has updated the building by-law to include “all the
earthquake resistant construction technologies”, it is “not yet en-
forced” (BSDMA representative). As suggested by a representative
of an international organisation in Bihar: “India is very good at
developing policies and plans….[but] take one guideline and go to the
community and it is lost.” A strong sense emerged that some laws
are not really implemented, particularly down to the local level in
Bihar. As a representative from government explained, “I think we
can’t just be relying on laws and implementation….you cannot leave
it at that.” Instead emphasis was placed on raising awareness,
education and training. It is clear from the interviews undertaken
that laws are insufﬁcient to create change.
In urban areas, and particularly in Patna, the capital of Bihar,
the problemwith building code implementation is related to a lack
of accountability in construction. One private construction com-
pany owner explained that there is a proposal in the state par-
liament for legislation that would hold both builders and en-
gineers responsible for the failure to construct earthquake safe
buildings. However, these draft laws are still to be presented to
parliament. This would require the government to take action
against the powerful builders’ lobby in Bihar which may be the
reason it has stalled.
According to Abdulraheem [1] lobbies fund politicians to meet
the high election costs and seek personal favours in return. Ab-
dulraheem also explains that “[M]any state funded construction
activities in India, such as road-building are dominated by the
construction maﬁa, which are groupings of corrupt public work
ofﬁcials, materials suppliers, politicians and construction con-
tractors”. He highlights shoddy construction and material sub-
stitution as two key problems which have serious implications for
building earthquake safe buildings. For example, in the focus
group discussion with non-state actors it was highlighted that
“even if there is a rule….even if stated, no one follows – bribing and
all those things” and “it’s about priorities – you have a cement lobby
and an iron lobby, other businesses….if everyone was accountable at
their point then things could change, but this is not the culture here.”
There were positive signs of change with the former Commis-
sioner of the Patna Municipal Corporation taking action against
builders and landowners constructing high rise buildings in vio-
lation of building laws in the state capital, resulting in the de-
molition of illegal buildings [46]. However, the commissioner in
question was later suspended by the Government of Bihar for his
tough stance following pressure from the ruling party [64,86,99].14 In May 2014, the Government of Nepal declared a further 72 municipalities
across 19 districts, increasing the total number to 130 [38].4.3. Incentives context in Nepal and Bihar
Above we emphasized the inﬂuence of donors in Nepal. A high
level of ‘political will’ for earthquake risk reduction certainly exists
amongst the donors. The necessity for urgently implementing
earthquake risk reduction measures is frequently framed by do-
nors in terms of ‘protecting development gains’. One re-
presentative from a bi-lateral donor suggested that “we had to
work this through….the fact that landslides and ﬂoods kill more
people – why should we focus on earthquakes?…. an earthquake
could unpick all the development gains [achieved] in the last thirty
years in forty seconds”. The measures for earthquake risk reduction
that donors have favoured have included more visible actions such
as retroﬁtting hospitals and schools, as well as less visible in-
itiatives such as strengthening building code implementation and
awareness-raising. Donors’ perceived need to justify the use of
taxpayers’ money may be a key reason for these choices and the
balance between the visible and invisible.
This level of political will among donors is not matched in
government, and it could be argued that it is only present in
government at all due to the ‘incentive’ provided by the avail-
ability of donor money. There is no government budget for DRR in
Nepal and as noted by a government representative “because the
national government does not have lot of funds for the prevention of
disaster activity…if we follow their [donor's] activity or re-
commendations then it is easy to get funding [for DRR]”. At the same
time, in order to avoid appearing to be a donor-driven agenda,
much of the language used by donors frames DRR processes as
being led, or owned, by government (e.g. “MoHA has requested it
[support with DRR] and we are supporting them in that request” as
suggested by a representative of the NRRC, and the NRRC itself
being framed as a ‘government-led’ initiative). This masks the
actual level of government commitment. A representative of the
NRRC expressed frustration at the lack of progress made by the
bureaucracy and suggested that the support provided by the NRRC
would be difﬁcult to maintain if the government could not show
that they were more committed. The development of the new
disaster management division within MoHA is being viewed as the
government starting to take the issue more seriously.
The role of key individuals, or ‘political champions’, in driving
the earthquake risk reduction agenda in Nepal, is also evident.
These high level individuals represent the UN system, embassies
and bilateral donor organisations. As discussed in Section 4.1, the
political clout of these organisations in Nepal, reﬂecting their po-
sition as prominent donors, is well recognised (Jones et al. [50]).
Key individuals have been seen to leverage their political capital,
promoting the earthquake risk reduction agenda with the Gov-
ernment of Nepal and the wider development community. As one
donor representative noted there had been “some real leadership…
in terms of the American ambassador [Scott DeLisi] and Robert Piper
[the former Resident Coordinator of the UN in Nepal]…”. Robert
Piper highlighted the urgent need for earthquake risk reduction in
Nepal at a high level UN meeting in 2012 [61] and was instru-
mental in establishing the NRRC and its ﬁve ﬂagship programmes
designed to reduce disaster risk in Nepal. The signiﬁcance a few
years ago, of DeLisi was also highlighted by a director of an in-
ternational NGO “it [earthquake risk reduction] became like resi-
lience is today only better – it was really a hot topic – and part of it
was the American Ambassador was very keen….deﬁnitely all of a
sudden there was an explosion of attention….they organised a big
workshop….there was like a peak of interest – you could say it
started in the beginning of 2011.” Recognising the governance
challenge in post-conﬂict Nepal, DeLisi used his position to get
earthquake on the agenda of the Government at the highest pos-
sible level; leveraged funding from government, donors and the
private sector; and established an inter-agency DRR ofﬁce which
15 Following a UNDP project to engage in community based disaster pre-
paredness across 14 of the 38 states, the state institute was trained to provide
training across rest of the state.
16 As one former BSDMA employee explained “So ﬁrst one is need of political will
– so Authority needs to motivate and sensitise them on the disaster scenario- how
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A further key ﬁgure in putting earthquake risk reduction more
ﬁrmly on the agenda in Nepal around the same time was the
former UK Minister of State for International Development, Alan
Duncan. The UK’s interest in DRR and resilience building can be
traced back to the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review
which argued that resilience should be at the heart of DFID’s ap-
proach to development [37]. In addition, Nepal was identiﬁed as a
priority country for UK Aid in the Bilateral Aid Review [21]. This
led to DFID becoming one of the main bilateral donors funding
DRR in Nepal, with the earthquake agenda being pushed in par-
ticular by Duncan following a visit to Nepal in 2011. The potential
to build on centuries of British–Nepal relations and to work to
prevent another Haiti-scale event, was appealing politically.
Key national champions of earthquake risk reduction include
the Executive Director of the national NGO, NSET-Nepal, Dr. Amod
Mani Dixit. Dixit works with, but also lobbies, the Government of
Nepal. He has prioritised earthquake risk reduction at a time when
the Government of Nepal has not, building Nepal’s earthquake risk
reduction capacity. Dixit’s commitment to earthquake risk reduc-
tion in Nepal resulted in him receiving a national award in 2013
from the President of Nepal for services to the Nation in the ﬁeld of
Disaster Risk Management. Unlike representatives from the in-
ternational community who are in post for relatively short periods,
Dixit and his organisation have been championing earthquake risk
reduction in Nepal for more than three decades. They see mem-
bers of the international development community come and go
with new ideas and ways of working. As a representative of a
national NGO explained: “The international community…they come
here for ﬁve years max….ﬁve years is long period but too short a
period for disaster management and everybody wants to get some-
thing done to their credits.” While the motivations of the interna-
tional and national political champions identiﬁed here are argu-
ably very different, they have all successfully motivated others and
generated political will around earthquake risk reduction in Nepal.
For a representative from the NRRC, the role played by ambassa-
dors and heads of missions is key. However, this remains a chal-
lenge: “if they [ambassadors/heads of missions] have two or three
advocacy points to government, this [earthquake risk reduction]
very often isn’t in those two or three advocacy points. Either because
we haven’t been able to convince them that this underpins so much of
their other work, or we haven’t been able to convince them of the
importance of this, or we haven’t been able to get the humanitarian
implications of this across to them strongly enough so that they feel
that they can put their reputations at risk by talking about this.”
(Representative of the NRRC).
In Bihar, as noted earlier, donor funding is much less signiﬁcant
and therefore key players in driving the DRR agenda are not from
external agencies, and neither are the key leaders from within
government motivated by the attraction of donor funding. It was
repeated by many interviewees that ﬁnancial resources are not a
key constraint at the state level. It was suggested that the Bihar
State Disaster Management Authority makes recommendations
(for projects/spending) to the Chief Minister and they get ap-
proved. One interviewee who had been in a key position in the
State Disaster Management Department, for example, noted that
“there is no dearth of funds as such, so donors are not at all required”.
Similarly, a representative from the BSDMA said “economically we
are very strong, now we have the money to fund anything – any
project. Money is not at all a constraint now.” However, it was
suggested by a UN representative that only half of the BSDMA’s
allocated budget was spent last year. This is a well-recognised
problem in Bihar and other states in India, with large amounts of
central state funding going unspent due to a lack of administrative
capacity [18,60].
Nevertheless, it appears that political champions have beenequally important in Bihar. One representative from an interna-
tional organisation stated that “the right people are in the right
place at the right time” to really make a difference in terms of
earthquake risk reduction. These people include the Chief Minister
(Nitish Kumar), who was the Head of the Agricultural Ministry in
the 1990s (which was then home for Disaster Management in
Central Government). As a representative from the State Disaster
Management Authority explained: “so fortunately he [the Chief
Minister] has got a deep appreciation and a serious concern about
this whole subject so that is why he is very, very keen that we pro-
mote this whole business of safety and culture of prevention.” The
Vice-Chairman of the Authority said: “This is about creating an
environment….that has been possible entirely due to the leadership of
the Chief Minister. He is the elected chief of the state, he’s the guiding
force, he’s the mentor, he’s the leader and he happens to be the
chairman of our Authority, statutory by law itself”. On a more cau-
tious and critical note, a consultant who had worked in DRR in
Bihar State, suggested that the “Chief Minister is very much clear on
the earthquake issue – but [the] Chief Minister alone cannot take all
the decisions”. Indeed it is clear that capacity and political will has
to exist at all levels to sustain impetus for earthquake risk
reduction.
Others with relevant expertise have been appointed to key
positions within government to create this ‘enabling environment'
for earthquake risk reduction. The Vice-Chairman of the BSDMA,
Anil Sinha, is highly regarded and respected and has worked both
as a District Magistrate and in disaster management at the na-
tional level as the member secretary of the High Powered Com-
mittee in the late 1990s (arising from the International Decade of
Natural Disaster Reduction). Under Sinha's leadership, the BSDMA
has established the State Disaster Management Policy and Plan,
coordinated earthquake awareness raising initiatives and provided
training for masons in earthquake safe construction practices. Also
within the Authority as a retired honorary member is Professor
Arya, who is a ‘world renowned seismic engineer’ and a National
Advisor to the Ministry of Home Affairs/UNDP Earthquake Vul-
nerability Reduction Programme. Dr Bala Prasad, Former Director
General of the Bihar Institute of Public Administration and Rural
Development (BIPARD), is another champion is also highly aligned
with the DRR agenda. His doctoral research compared disaster
management approaches across four states in India. BIPARD pro-
vides training for state administrative ofﬁcials (at the district,
block and panchayat levels).15 Finally, Mr D Sah, a seismic en-
gineering expert, directs the Police Building Construction Cor-
poration (a state body responsible for the construction of all police
buildings). Under Sah’s leadership the corporation is leading the
way in earthquake safe construction of state buildings. Mr. Sah has
called on the government to follow its own building code despite
entailing an 8–10% increase in construction costs. Such pressure
has led to the requirement that all new government buildings
comply with the building code (BSDMA representative).
While leadership in earthquake risk reduction is strong in Bi-
har, the broader political will behind earthquake risk reduction is
less clear, particularly given the state's susceptibility to ﬂooding, a
reality that has the potential for diverting politicians’ attention.
Members of the BSDMA are aware of the importance of political
will in driving the earthquake risk reduction agenda. They are
therefore raising awareness of seismic risk across government
departments and political parties (as well as the general
population).16 When asked about retroﬁtting and securing lifeline
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suggesting that awareness needed to be raised ﬁrst, the rationale
being that through awareness-raising comes demand for earth-
quake safety.17
During the focus group discussion with non-state actors, this
was looked upon somewhat cynically, suggesting that training
programmes are run by the government to “protect themselves so
that when asked ‘what do you do’ [they can say] I have been giving
training to the people and everything like that – rather than actual
intention of protecting these [the population]”. It was also suggested
by a representative of an international organisation that aware-
ness-raising was something of a smokescreen for inadequacies in
engaging in more structural measures: “So the question of political
will….retroﬁtting guidelines are being produced etc. [but] are these
being adhered to? Can you show any building that has been retro-
ﬁtted? Can you see any building being constructed adhering to these
norms? That is the question mark. I don’t think it is just a matter of
time, unless and until they change their approach to concrete action
on the ground”.
Skepticism, or at least caution, has also been expressed con-
cerning the role of champions. Williams [101, p. 33] concludes a
review of many case studies as follows: “In many countries, par-
ticular individuals have played a decisive role in promoting DRR
reforms and institution building. The existence of these ‘cham-
pions’ provides a more favourable environment for obtaining in-
ternational support, but their inﬂuence may not be permanent.
There is a risk of placing too much optimism in the potential of
individuals to bring about change, while downplaying the role of
more systemic constraints.”
Due to the nature of earthquake risk reduction measures as
public goods, it is virtually impossible to conﬁne their beneﬁts to
an allied group supporting a particular political party (in the way
that disaster relief can be) so there is little scope for political will
to arise out of the potential to win political support through pa-
tronage as Williams [101] suggests. Earthquake risk reduction, it
was pointed out by one state employee, including even the most
visible measures such as retroﬁtting hospitals and schools, “does
not win votes”. He noted that “as far as people are concerned, they
will hardly vote for preparedness which the government shows in
respect of earthquakes-that is not a very important thing with the
public. They will appreciate it if something is done that is in the larger
interests of the society and if and when it happens.”
It is well recognized that disaster events can provide a window
of opportunity for change (see, for example, [77], [6]. Unlike other
countries in South Asia, disasters of the scale of the 2015 earth-
quakes are rare in Nepal and this has had an impact on the (lack
of) action taken to reduce disaster risk, both in terms of the(footnote continued)
earthquake … If the state politics is more interested in the disaster management so
they can do anything – state minister and concerned ministers of the departments –
they can take any initiatives. Anything that is proposed unless and until it is approved
by the cabinet [comprising of these ministers] it cannot move forward.” Attempts to
‘motivate’ MPs had so far not met with success “at the same time it was refused from
the cabinet – no, this kind of work is not necessary right now, not much time, several
other issues. So somehow a lack of interest, lack of sensitisation is there.”
17 Literature on the public support for earthquake risk reduction elsewhere is
scarce. In the US, Tierney suggests that there is a “somewhat contradictory picture
of the strength and scope of public support for hazard-reduction measures. On the
one band, there is a substantial body of work in the social sciences suggesting that
both the general public and opinion leaders assign a low priority to earthquake and
other disaster-related loss-reduction programs … [O]n the other hand, some stu-
dies have shown that signiﬁcant public support does exist for stronger seismic
safety measures” [89]. Similarly, studies on the relationship between knowledge
and preparedness show inconsistent ﬁndings. While a number of authors highlight
the importance of awareness-raising as a pre-requisite for preparedness (e.g. [44],
[85], empirical research on the relationship effect of awareness campaigns/
knowledge on preparedness behaviour suggest only small improvements (e.g. [82],
[51] or none at all (e.g. [74], [47], [3].political impetus for action and in terms of the funding available
for action. As a representative from the NRRC explained: “Compare
it with Bangladesh. Bangladesh has a major emergency every 2, 3,
4 years and has done for the last few decades which has meant it’s at
the forefront of communities’ minds, it’s at the forefront of policy
makers’ minds. People will hold politicians and bureaucrats accoun-
table because everyone knows the next crisis will come…[Bangladesh
has received humanitarian assistance and] it’s been humanitarian
money that’s been used to support DRR [in country]. Now we haven’t
had that here [in Nepal]…Also, even in Bangladesh….it’s probably
taken 12–15 years to get legislation through, to get the NDMA [Na-
tional Disaster Management Authority] created, to ensure there is
some kind of linkage between the national and the local DMAs
[Disaster Management Authorities]. In India it was after Gujarat that
the NDMA got created, in Pakistan it was after the Kashmir earth-
quake…in Indonesia, in Sri Lanka and Maldives it was after the
tsunami…We haven’t had the triggers [disaster events]…[or the]
humanitarian funding which could be used to set everything up, both
as an incentive and as some kind of future accountability
mechanism”.
The 2011 Sikkim earthquake affected 23,425 families across 18
districts in Nepal, killing seven people and injuring 88 [40]. De-
scried as a “wake up call for Nepal” [22], [42], the earthquake was
found to have little impact on DRR policy and practice in Nepal.
The main reasons cited by respondents were that the earthquake
was not high impact enough; that it did not cause serious damage
in the Kathmandu Valley which is where government concerns
mainly lie; that the Government of Nepal's response was con-
sidered effective, indicating that they could therefore manage in
the event of a high magnitude earthquake. As an interviewee from
a multilateral agency explained: “If a politician is hit by a disaster
that is what [helps] the agenda. In the case of [the] 1988 [earthquake]
it was the eastern region that was hit. The ruling party, the Prime
Minister, the Minister of Home Affairs came from that very place…If
they did not act on it they would lose the votes…It [the 2011 Sikkim
earthquake] didn’t get the same momentum…it [happened] at the
most ideal time that it could happen. It didn’t shake the entire
country, it was limited geographically to the eastern part, also in the
hills not the plains, not where the densest of the settlements are. God
gave a gentle slap on the hand. Politicians could have taken that as a
major turning point [reducing future risk]…but this was not a normal
time, it was just after a conﬂict, there was not a stable government
back then”.
Other signiﬁcant recent events include the 2008 Kosi ﬂood
disaster which affected three million people in Bihar, with ap-
proximately 3000 lives lost [78]. This was the eighth breach of the
Kosi embankment which Mishra [62] attributes to “ofﬁcial apathy
towards the embankments of the Kosi”. Indeed according to
Mishra [62], “virtually no ruling party can claim (including the
administration under president’s rule) that it was not involved in
such an incident”. Focusing on the institutional causes of the 2008
ﬂood disaster, Shrestha et al. [75] summarize these as “lack of local
awareness and disaster preparedness, lack of anticipation and
prioritization given to the possibility of an embankment breach,
lack of monitoring and maintenance of the embankments, the
hierarchical communication mechanism, and the exclusive and
complex nature of the institutional design for dealing with the
Kosi”. With ﬂood management the responsibility of state govern-
ments in India, the 2008 ﬂood has been described as a ‘focusing
event’ from the perspective of the Bihar State government re-
sulting in an increased focus on preparedness and response with
evidence of policy reform and capacity building [71].
5. Discussion and conclusion
We began by citing Wilkinson's [100] list of DRR-related roles
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 provision of disaster risk reduction goods and services
 avoidance of the creation of risk in its own construction and
other activities
 regulation of private sector activity.
 promotion of collective action
 coordination of multi-stakeholder activities.
In the neo-liberal context of ‘rolling back’ the state, it may be
expected that these ﬁve roles will become increasingly difﬁcult to
meet. In the context of India, the neo-liberal agenda seems to have
created a particular challenge for the state as a ‘regulator of private
activity’ as the power of the construction lobby is a key challenge.
In Bihar, it seems that ﬁnancial resources are being made available
for certain state roles to be met (such as the budget that the
BSDMA has secured) and these ﬁnancial resources are safeguarded
against changes in government, generating a potentially stable and
sustainable context for DRR and earthquake resilience building to
take place. Some provision of goods and services is being made,
particularly in terms of awareness-raising and building safer in-
frastructure (avoidance of the creation of risk in its own construc-
tion). The state also seems to be playing the role of promoter of
collective action through awareness-raising. The BSDMA is in a
good position institutionally to coordinate multi-stakeholder activ-
ity given the position of the Chief Minister as its head and the
requirement of all ministers to attend key meetings. The impetus
for DRR comes from within the state and the directives from the
National Disaster Management Authority. Once something is ap-
proved through the BSDMA, it can be relatively easily rolled out
across the whole state (e.g. earthquake safety in schools). Parti-
cular challenges include the translation of policy into practice but
the strong state-led political context in which disaster risk re-
duction takes place suggests a promising future.
In comparison, these ﬁve roles for the state in post-conﬂict
Nepal are mostly being adopted by external institutions. A low
level of political will to build earthquake resilience seems to exist
within the state and that which does exist seems to be conjured
forth by the attraction of donor funding. This situation may be
exacerbated by the fact that the cost of recovery and reconstruc-
tion (at least in terms of large scale disasters such the Gorkha
earthquake) are partially met by the international community. The
lack of government engagement is reﬂected in the situation that as
yet, the institutional architecture for DRR does not generate any
authority to enable mainstreaming across departments. In terms
of coordination roles, the NRRC has been established in part to
support this function.
Some of the key work around risk avoidance and the provision of
public goods is being accomplished by key NGOs such as NSET. In
terms of regulating private activity, most construction still takes
place at a household level, so private sector lobbies against
building codes are not strong in Nepal. This may well change with
the construction of multi-storey apartment blocks and large
commercial buildings particularly in Kathmandu. The state has
demonstrated its authority in the past. In 2013, government im-
plemented plans for road widening despite damage caused to the
homes of rich and poor alike [43]. However, when it comes to
building code enforcement, the responsible department (DUDBC)
does not have the required level of authority and power.
In summary, while the institutional context for DRR is much
less effective in Nepal than in Bihar, progress (in the minimalist
deﬁnition we introduced at the beginning) has been greater in
Nepal, driven largely by donors and the need to ‘protect devel-
opment gains’. This is a fragile and potentially less sustainable
situation. The strengthening of the state apparatus to better fulﬁl
these ﬁve roles, is absolutely necessary for sustainable resiliencebuilding in Nepal.
Throughout the rest of 2015 and 2016, lessons of the tragic
earthquake in Nepal will be learned. These lessons will hopefully
inform a process of ‘building back better’ through the governance
of risk and not just the construction of buildings and infra-
structure. It is essential that the in-depth forensic studies that
follow focus not only on the impact of the DRR interventions of the
past decade but the longer-term development programmes and
their impact on human security [72].
Central to this is the issue of governance. The framework pre-
sented in this paper reﬂects a way of thinking about governance
that may help those involved in documenting and understanding
the Nepal earthquake to illuminate strengths and weaknesses of
different governance systems for DRR. For example the ‘institu-
tional context’ (the formal government structures which are sup-
porting DRR implementation and mainstreaming for DRR) in Bihar
is strong, while the ‘stakeholder context' in Nepal enables pow-
erful outside institutions to play a role in strengthening DRR. By
disaggregating the governance landscape in this way, the speciﬁc
areas that would beneﬁt from targeted strengthening may be
identiﬁed more easily.6. Epilogue
The earthquakes on 25 April (the Gorkha Earthquake) and 12
May 2015 validate our analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of
risk governance in Nepal and Bihar. The aftermath of these events
already (October 2015 at this writing) have changed governance in
Nepal, and these changes are bound to have a ripple effect on the
structure and process of risk governance in particular. Having
failed to legislate a new constitution for many years following the
end of the civil war, Nepal's parliament brought the document in
June, less than six weeks after the ﬁrst earthquake [48]. The new
constitution came into force on 20 September. Among other
things, the new constitutional order mandates a federal state
composed of states, each with their own parliaments and execu-
tive branches. The pre-existing districts, villages and munici-
palities are to be encompassed by this additional level of state
government. The demarcation of these new states-ﬁve North–
South swaths of territory from the mountains on the frontier with
China and two others oriented East–West in the lowland, Terai
zone bordering India-has been very controversial [35]. Minority
ethnic groups protested that such a spatial division would frag-
ment them and dilute their electoral power. Protests turned vio-
lent and forty-ﬁve people have died [39].
Meanwhile, six months after the earthquake the Government
of Nepal had failed to spend any of the more than USD 4 billion
pledged by donors for recovery [57]), a consequence of political
distraction foreseen by some [31] and acknowledged by the di-
rector of the newly formed National Recovery Authority, Govinda
Raj Pokharel [57]. Our analysis demonstrated that government in
Nepal is dependent upon external institutions for DRR. The Gorkha
Earthquake revealed that government is also dependent on these
external institutions not only for relief but for recovery. While
dependence is to a degree built into the deﬁnition of ‘disaster’ as
an event adequate response to which requires more than can be
mobilized at local or national scale (depending on the size of the
impact), self-reliance or at least leadership and coordination nor-
mally reemerge. Given the challenge of restructuring government
under the new constitution and the continuing lack of consensus
in the national parliament, even delaying the establishment of the
National Recovery Authority [87], we have to wonder when and if
DRR will become a national priority.
On the Bihar side of the border, this Indian state was not badly
affected by the earthquakes in Nepal. India mobilized considerable
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with our analysis, in Bihar, the State Disaster Management Au-
thority (BSDMA) launched a study to learn lessons from Nepal of
relevance to strengthening DRR at home [76].Acknowledgements
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